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The need is apparent for reform in tax systems which may well have
relied too long and too heavily on the local property tax. And certainly
innovative thinking as to public education, its methods, and its funding
is necessary to assure both a higher level of quality and greater
uniformity of opportunity.'
When a state relies on local property taxes as a source of funding for public
schools, the property wealth disparities from district to district can give rise to
inequities in both tax rates and per pupil expenditure levels. This situation has
generated recurring constitutional objections based on federal and state equal
protection claims. The California Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Serrano
v. Priest' is often cited as the first state court decision to side with those
objecting to the inequities arising from a reliance on local property taxes. A
little known fact, however, is that Greencastle Township v. Black,4 an earlier
Indiana Supreme Court decision, rejected a local property tax scheme in the
fifties-in fact, in the eighteen fifties. 1854 to be exact.
That decision was overruled thirty years later by Robinson v. Schenck,5
when the Indiana courts reopened the legal pathway permitting the use of local
property taxes to finance public schools. But the issue was by no means resolved,
as evidenced by a recent case in Indiana6 and the constant stream of litigation
throughout the nation in the past two decades. In 1973, the United States
I. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973) (Powell, J.) (school financingbased on local property taxes does not violate U.S. Constitution), reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973).2. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (reliance on wealth of local school district denies equal protection), cert.
denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
3. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Validity of Basing Public School Financing System on
Local Property Taxes, 41 A.L.R.3d 1220 (1972 & Supp. 1992).
4. Greencastle Township v. Black, 5 Ind. 557 (1854), overruled by Robinson v. Schenck, I N.E. 698,
707 (Ind. 1885).
5. Robinson v. Schenck, 1 N.E. 698 (Ind. 1885).
6. In 1987, several school corporations in Indiana filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality ofthe statutory scheme established to finance its public schoois. Lake Cent. Sch. Corp. v. State, No. 487-109(Lake Super. Ct. filed Feb. 20, 1987; renumbered No. 56C01-8703-CP-81, Newton Cir. Ct.). The case wassettled in the summer of 1992, apparently due to the plaintiff school corporations' unwillingness to continuefinancing the lawsuit. The settlement agreement allows the schools to refile their suit in 1993, after the GeneralAssembly has had an opportunity to consider alternative funding formulas. Susan Hanafee, Money ConcernsHelp Settle Lawsuit on School Funding, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 4, 1992, at Al.
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Supreme Court foreclosed potential federal equal protection claims in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
7 noting that education was
not a fundamental right warranting heightened scrutiny.
8 As a consequence,
suits based on state constitutional claims have flourished,
9 and to this day school
finance reformers continue to make their cases in state courts around the
country?0 One proposal aimed at redressing fiscal disparities in school finance
has been to remove nonresidential property from the local tax base for education
purposes." Empirical studies completed during the 1970's criticized this and
other equalization proposals as counterproductive to equity objectives.
2 Critics
argued that because low-income families are generally concentrated in areas
rich in commercial wealth, pooling the revenues from such sources would sap
the cities, disadvantaging the already disadvantaged. This Note reexamines and
7. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
8. Id. at 40 ("It should be clear ... that this is not a case in which the challenged state action 
must
be subjected to the searching judicial scrutiny reserved for laws that create suspect classifications 
or impinge
upon constitutionally protected rights.").
9. Cases which have upheld state school financing formulas or made a determination 
that education
is not a fundamental right triggering strict scrutiny include: Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 
590 (Ariz. 1973);
Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); McDaniel v. Thomas, 
285 S.E.2d 156
(Ga. 1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); People ex rel. Jones v. Adams, 
350 N.E.2d
767 (I1. App. Ct. 1976); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); East Jackson
Pub. Sch. v. State, 348 N.W.2d 303 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Board of Educ. of Levittown v. 
Nyquist, 439
N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982), dismissed, 459 U.S. 1138 (1983); Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. 
of Educ., 357
S.E.2d 432 (N.C. Ct. App.), discretionary review denied, 361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987); Fair 
Sch. Finance
Council of Okla. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 
1976); Danson
v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); Richiand County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 
1988); Kukor V.
Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989). Cases which have declared state financing formulas 
unconstitutional
or made a determination that education is a fundamental right triggering strict scrutiny include: 
DuPree v.
Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 
1971); Horton
v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Rose v. Council forBetter Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); 
Helena
Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989), modified, 784 P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990); 
Robinson
v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 
1989);
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. 
Va. 1979);
Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. l v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 824 (1980).
10. See William Cells 3d, 23 States Face Suits on School Funds, N.Y. TIMIES, September 2, 1992, 
at
B7 (detailing lawsuits filed by parents, school districts and civil rights organizations over 
state school
financing).
11. See Ferdinand P. Schoettle, Judicial Requirements for School Finance and Property Tax 
Redesign:
The Rapidly Evolving Case Law, 25 NAT'L TAX J. 455, 463-64 (1972).
12. See Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Judicial Pursuit of Local Fiscal Equity, 92 
HARV.
L. REV. 1662 (1979) (arguing that"only programs based on income redistribution or on centralized financing
of local services will result in tax and spending equity"); Helen F. Ladd, State-wide Taxation of 
Commercial
and Industrial Property for Education, 29 NAT'L TAX J. 143 (1976) (presenting data for Boston 
Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area suggesting that state-wide taxation of commercial and industrial 
property would
have adverse distributional consequences for low-income areas); F. Howard Nelson, A Note on 
the Effects
of Commercial and Industrial Property in School Spending Decisions, 37 NAT'L TAX J. 121, 
124 (1984)
("In the Wisconsin statewide simulation, one can infer that resources devoted to education move 
from urban
areas, characterized by higher concentrations of commercial and industrial property and higher 
incomes,
to small and rural school districts."); Edward A. Zelinsky, Educational Equalization and Suburban 
Sprawl:
Subsidizing the Suburbs Through School Finance Reform, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 161 (1976) (presenting 
data
for Connecticut suggesting that many proposed equalization formulas would have adverse fiscal 
impact on
Connecticut's central cities); Note, A StatisticalAnalysis of the School Finance Decisions: On Winning 
Battles
and Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303 (1972) (presenting data for Connecticut suggesting that equalization
plans could have an adverse redistributive impact).
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reworks the proposal to tax nonresidential property on a statewide basis. Data
examined from Indiana demonstrate that such a pooled revenue approach can
relieve fiscal disparities, as well as generate collateral benefits for the state as
a whole. The proposal is presented through a six-step analytical process. In Part
I, I present an overview of the various interests at stake in school finance
litigation through a brief assessment of the constitutional principles that generally
govern a state funding system for public education. I present the Greencastle
and Robinson decisions mentioned above as a paradigm of the contending
constitutional and state interests. In Part H, I seek to define with greater precision
the state interest in local control and the constitutional concern for tax and
spending equity. I narrow the concept of local control t9 its essential core,
defining it as local resident voter responsiveness to local educational needs. I
argue that local control so defined is primarily a function of local control over
residential property taxation.
In the Part III, I provide a theoretical analysis of the impact statewide
taxation of nonresidential property would have on the contending objectives
articulated in Part II. Drawing from the principles underpinning a statute
developed for the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area, I put forth a proposal
which distinguishes between residential and nonresidential property for school
property tax purposes, leaving taxation of the former to localities while taxing
the latter through a statewide system, the proceeds of which would be distributed
to districts in inverse relation to their residential property taxing capacity. I refer
to this proposal throughout the Note as STNP (Statewide Taxation of
Nonresidential Property). In Part IV, I present the results of an empirical
simulation of the STNP approach, using property tax and expenditure figures
derived from the 1990-91 school year in Indiana. The data detailed in Part IV
reveal that STNP provides for substantially greater fiscal equity and, contrary
to previous studies, does not significantly jeopardize the fiscal position of school
corporations in Indiana's largest urban centers. These results suggest that STNP
would improve the fiscal position of most districts, including some of the districts
in the state's largest cities.
In Part V, I provide a constitutional analysis of this proposal, suggesting
arguments which could be framed in opposition to and in favor of such a school
funding system. Finally, I briefly discuss a handful of collateral policy issues
which would necessarily be implicated by the proposal to tax nonresidential
property on a statewide basis.
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I. STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE
A. Constitutional Principles Governing School Finance in Indiana
Like most state constitutions, the Indiana Constitution contains provisions
pertaining to education 3 and tax uniformity. 4 The provisions regarding
education are outlined in article 8, section 1, which reads:
Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a community,
being essential to the preservation of free government; it shall be the
duty of the General Assembly to encourage by all suitable means,
moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement; and to
provide, by law, for a general and uniform system of Common Schools,
wherein tuition shall be without charge, and equally open to all. 5
With respect to uniformity of taxation, article 10, section 1 of the Indiana
Constitution states that "[t]he General Assembly shall provide, by law, for a
uniform and equal rate of property assessment and taxation and shall prescribe
regulations to secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, both real and
personal." 16 Reading these two clauses together brings into clearer focus the
debate concerning fiscal disparities in public school finance. A reliance on the
wealth of local school districts arguably leads to a nonuniform system of schools
(because of varying levels of per pupil expenditure) and nonuniform rates of
taxation.7 These were precisely the concerns that occupied the Indiana Supreme
Court in 1854 and in 1885, in the Greencastle and Robinson decisions which
determined the course of school finding in Indiana. These two cases form a
paradigm of today's debate regarding school finance reform. While the
Greencastle decision looks to the state for compliance with a strict view of
uniformity in education and taxation, the Robinson decision adopts the broader,
more deferential view of uniformity, leaving financing specifics to legislative
discretion. In many ways, those who seek judicial assistance in school finance
reform today make the argument of the Greencastle court, while state attorneys.
general, in contrast, argue in favor of the sort of judicial deference articulated
in Robinson. These arguments have emerged repeatedly throughout the country
13. See Julie K. Underwood and William E. Sparkman, School Finance Litigation: A New Wave of
Reform, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 517,533 n.54 (1991) (listing education articles of state constitutions).
14. See WADE J. NEWHOUSE, CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY IN STATE TAXATION (2d
ed. 1984) (providing state-by-state analysis of state constitutions' tax uniformity provisions).
15. IND. CONST. art. VIII, § I (emphasis added).
16. Id. art. X, § I (emphasis added).
17. Another important factor in tax uniformity is uniformity in valuation standards. The current Indiana
property tax system has been criticized as "archaic" and ripe for reform. See Lawrence A. Jegen, M] & John
R. Maley, Developments in Indiana Tax Law: Further Refinements of the Indiana Tax Courts Jurisdiction.
and the Attack on Indiana's Property Tax System, 24 IND. L. REV. 1125, 1153 (1991); see also Larry J.
Stroble & Ronald D'Avis, Current Issues Affecting Indiana Tax Policy, 22 IND. L. REV. 449 (1988) (giving
overview of current issues in Indiana property taxation).
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in the past twenty years, and the recent legal battle over school finance reform
in Indiana has been in large part a debate over these two cases.' 8
B. The Litigators' Perspective: The Strict View of Uniformity in Greencastle
The Indiana Supreme Court decided Greencastle v. Black'9 in 1854. In
June, 1852, the Indiana legislature enacted a statute providing for a general and
uniform system of common schools and school libraries. The statute contained
provisions for the funding of the state's public schools, including section 130,
which read as follows:
The voters of any township shall have power at any general or special
meeting to vote a tax for the purpose of building or repairing school
houses, and purchasing sites therefor, providing fuel, furniture, maps,
apparatus, libraries or increase thereof, or to discharge debts incurred
therefor, and for continuing their schools after the public funds shall
have been expended, to any amount not exceeding annually... fifty
cents on each poll.20
In April, 1853, the voters of Greencastle township authorized a local tax of
fifteen cents on each $100 worth of property for common school purposes.
Alexander Black, a property owner who had voted against the tax, brought suit
against the county treasurer for the $26.20 assessed against his property, alleging
that the local tax was unconstitutional. The Indiana Supreme Court accepted
Black's argument, finding section 130 repugnant to the 1851 constitution. In
an extraordinary opinion, the court anticipated many of the issues which would
arise a century later in school finance litigation in California, Texas, New Jersey
and elsewhere:
[The state occupies the position of a parent to her children, whose duty
it is to see that all are equally provided with the means of education.
For the purpose of supplying such means, the constitution authorizes
her not only to use the funds heretofore set apart for that purpose, but
to compel the elder brothers of the same family, by "a uniform and
equal rate of assessment and taxation," to aid her in carrying out the
scheme; and as the diffusion of knowledge and learning is regarded
by the constitution as "essential to the preservation of free govern-
ments," it would seem but just that those who enjoy such a government
should equally assist in contributing to its preservation. The inhabitants
18. See Defendants' Reply Brief at 1, Lake Cent. Sch. Corp. v. State of Indiana, Cause No. 56CO1-8703-
CP-81 (Newton Cir. Ct.) ("[P]laintiffs essentially concede that they are requesting this Court to either overrule
or ignore the controlling precedent that has been established in the State of Indiana, Robinson v. Schenck.")
19. 5 Ind. 557 (1854).
20. IND. CODE chap. 98, § 130 (1852). The rights of school districts in assessing property tax levies
are presently codified at IND. CODE § 6-1.1-19 et seq. (1992).
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of one county or township should not be compelled to bear greater
burdens than are borne by all.21
Under such a view of tax uniformity, varying tax rates from district to district
unquestionably violate the state constitution. In terms of current taxing inequities,
this view regards as constitutionally unacceptable the fact that taxpayers in Gary
shoulder an 8.19% property tax burden, while taxpayers in Prairie Township
bear only a 1.18% rate.22 The Greencastle critique is not limited to tax rate
inequities, however, as evidenced by the attention accorded by the court to the
education article:
[I]f the provisions of section 130 are to be regarded as constitutional,
the uniformity of the common school system would be at once
destroyed. In some townships, taxes would be assessed by vote, and
in others not; in some, a sufficient amount might be raised to support
their schools six, nine or twelve months; so that there would really exist
no uniformity either as to the time the school should be kept, or as to
the amount of the taxes to be paid by the inhabitants of the respective
townships.
But the want of uniformity would not be the only evil resulting
from such a construction, as the power of controlling schools would
necessarily, to a great extent, pass from the state and the superintendent
into the hands of the local authorities of the different townships. Should
the legislature pass a law for the assessment of a mere nominal tax,
(a supposition not remote from probability,) the whole school system
would be left to the mercy of a popular vote of the different townships;
and thus all the evils of the old system which were intended to be
avoided by the new constitution-inequality of education, inequality
of taxation, lack of uniformity in schools, and a shrinking from
legislative responsibilities, would be the inevitable result.'I
The rhetoric of Greencastle is today quite familiar, and for many the inequities
in taxes and in school quality have in fact persisted.24 The state's countervailing
argument in favor of local control of school finance, however, carried
irrepressible logical and practical force. In spite of the Greencastle decision,
the Indiana General Assembly enacted a statute in 1867 permitting districts to
assess local property taxes. Three decades later, the Indiana Supreme Court
21. 5 Ind. at 563-64.
22. See INDIANA FARM BUREAU, SCHOOL STATISTICAL REPORT 39, 88 (1991).
23. 5 Ind. at 564.
24. For example, in New Hampshire, where nearly 90% of the resources dedicated to public education
are derived from local property taxes, the State Board of Education recently moved to eliminate virtually
all minimum education standards. Many superintendents now fear that property-poor districts will be unable
to sustain programs previously mandated by the state, due to an unwillingness among taxpayers to shoulder
even greater tax burdens. Property-wealthy districts, in contrast, have the ability to generate revenue less
painfully and may be able to sustain current programs with only minor tax increases. William Celis 3d, Furor
in New Hampshire on Vote to Cut Standards, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 26, 1992, at B7.
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upheld the statute, thereby putting its constitutional imprimatur on what had
become a legislative reality and the national norm.
C. The State Perspective: The Broad Interpretation of Uniformity in Robinson
In 1885 the Indiana Supreme Court overruled Greencastle in Robinson v.
Schenck?2 In that case, taxpayer Schenck challenged a local tax against his
property in the city of Vevay. Though the tax at issue related to teachers' salaries
rather than school buildings as in Greencastle, the case bore much resemblance
to the previous suit, and the Court refused to distinguish the two cases. In
explicitly overruling Greencastle, the court upheld as constitutional a statute
empowering the school trustees of cities to levy local property taxes. The court's
opinion established a powerful legal foundation for local control and local
financing, noting:
It is possible, and only possible, to build up an efficient system by
leaving local school matters, under proper general laws, to the people
of the different localities .... T]he only way in which a great and
efficient common school system can be successfully maintained is to
entrust to the people of the different localities, by general laws, the
government of local school affairs. 26
Such a forceful endorsement of local control against constitutional concerns
could only be accomplished by a high degree of deference to legislative
discretion in the area of school finance. Uniformity was interpreted broadly,
requiring only that statutes be uniformly applicable to all school corporations,
not that all school corporations benefit uniformly from the statute. In expressing
this broader view of uniformity, however, the Court was careful to articulate
what it viewed as the constitutional parameters of legislative discretion:
The Legislature may, in their discretion, support all the schools of the
State by means of a general levy directly made by a legislative act, or
they may thus provide for part of the expense of maintaining the
schools, or they may delegate to local officers the power to levy such
taxes as in their judgment may be needed to supply the wants of the
local schools and make them useful and effective.... The Legislature
shall not make an unequal distribution of money derived from a general
levy, make an unequal general levy, or grant to some school
corporations benefits or rights withheld from others.27
25. 1 N.E. 698 (Ind. 1885).
26. Id. at 699.
27. Id. at 705 (emphasis added).
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Although the imposition of local property taxes for school purposes was
constitutionally protected through Robinson, the mandate to the legislature was
not unchecked. For example, under Robinson the General Assembly may not
permit local property taxation in some districts while prohibiting it in others.
However, as long as the rights under any legislative scheme are available to
all districts, the constitution is not implicated. The standards of uniformity
expounded in the constitution were not suspended, but rather broadened to
incorporate a wider array of financing choices for the legislature. The challenge
then, as now, was to balance the need to create a uniform system of schools
with the demand for local control over some portion of the school financing
system.
D. The Financing of Indiana's Public Schools'
Like most states, Indiana has sought to balance the requirements of equity
and local control through a financing system which combines local, state, and
federal resources. Prior to 1974, Indiana funded its schools through a foundation
program, under which school districts were provided with state grant assistance
once local property taxes were levied at a state-determined minimum rate.29
In 1974, the Indiana legislature changed its funding formula to incorporate a
property tax freeze at 1973 levels. While this system has undergone occasional
modifications in the past two decades, its basic structure remains essentially
in place.30 The local contribution consists primarily of resources derived from
local property tax levies against parcels located within the taxing jurisdiction.
The rates established for this purpose are governed by statutory limitations. Each
school corporation is assigned a Maximum Normal Tax Levy (MNTL), which
is the 1973 actual tax levy adjusted to reflect minor increases. State support
consists primarily of a basic per pupil grant, which ensures receipt of the
previous year's state contribution and adjusts for growth in per pupil counts.
The State also guarantees a minimum per pupil revenue ($3,045 for 1991-92),
where local taxes plus the standard basic grant are insufficient in generating
this amount.1
Under the current formula, the local share of total school expenditures has
decreased substantially over the period beginning with the property tax freeze.
28. For a recent study of Indiana's public school funding system, see Marilyn R. Holscher, Note, Funding
Indiana's Public Schools. A Question of Equal and Adequate Educational Opportunity, 25 VAL. U. L. REV.
273 (1991). For a more thorough treatment of the development of Indiana school finance, see ROBERT G.
LEHNEN & CARLYN E. JOHNSON, FINANCING INDIANA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PAST AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE (1984).
29. For an overview of the pre-1974 Indiana school finance system, see Edward W. Najam, Jr., Public
School Finance in Indiana: A Critique, 48 IND. LJ. 70 (1972).
30. IND. CODE § 6-1.1-19 et seq. (1992).
31. For a general overview of the financing of Indiana's public schools, see INDIANA DEP'T OF EDUC.,
DIGEST OF PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE IN INDIANA: 1991-93 BIENNIUM (1992).
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In the mid-1980's, the proportions of state and local contribution leveled off
at roughly 35% from local resources and 65% from the state.32 An assumption
generally drawn from an increase in the state share of financing is greater fiscal
equity; however, a recent study of the implications of Indiana's system of
property tax restrictions offers different conclusions:
Despite the state assuming more of the expenditures, the share of the
expenditures paid by the local taxing districts has made school operating
expenditures more inequitable.
In Indiana, there still exists (as of the 1985-86 school year) a
relationship between a school taxing district's wealth and the amount
that the taxing district spends on its pupils. Those taxing districts that
have more wealth, as measured by the assessed valuation per pupil,
spend more money on their pupils than those taxing districts that have
less wealth.
This study provides strong evidence that within Indiana, fiscal
inequity exists for pupils and taxpayers.3
In addition to these continuing questions of tax and spending uniformity under
Indiana's current system, there are reasons to believe that local control weakened
with the onset of property tax limitations. The MNTL governs the amount of
tax revenues a locality can generate and it can only be exceeded through
authorization of an excessive levy by local referendum. Ironically, the challenge
presented in Robinson of balancing local control and uniformity seems to have
given way to a rejection of both, re-igniting the concerns of inequity and
inefficiency articulated in Greencastle.
II. DEFINING THE CONTENDING INTERESTS
A principal challenge to the Indiana legislature today is to bring the debate
regarding school finance back into the realm of the Robinson decision of 1885.
In Robinson, the Indiana Supreme Court sought to accommodate both the state's
interest in local control and the constitutional concerns of education and tax
uniformity. In contrast, the school funding structure presently in place in Indiana
reduces local control and seems to disregard the constitutional principles of
uniformity. For example, the statutory limitations on property tax levies
significantly impair local districts' capacity to meet increasing expenditure
needs.34 One recent study presents new evidence that property tax limitations
32. See INDIANA FARM BUREAU, SCHOOL STATISTICAL REPORT 9-10 (1991).
33. R. Craig Wood et al., Equity in Indiana School Finance: A Decade of Local Levy Property Tax
Restrictions, 16 J. EDUC. FIN. 83, 92 (1990).
34. See Larry J. Gambaiani, The Problems and Concerns of Overseeing the Financial Aspects of a Small
School Corporation in Indiana: A Practitioner's Viewpoint, 55 CONTEMP. EDUC. 156 (1984) ("Unlike the
years prior to 1974 when a board could advertise to their public that they wished to raise tax rates a few
cents to allow them the flexibility they felt they would need in their coming year's operation, it is difficult
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of the sort employed in Indiana have a greater effect on property tax revenue
growth and municipal revenues than previously thought.3 5 The policy of limiting
property tax levies, therefore, must be reconsidered in order to bring into play
the objectives of local control and tax and spending equity. Crucial in prioritizing
these objectives, however, is a recognition that too much enthusiasm for one
necessarily impairs the other. A careful definition of both, therefore, is the first
step.
A. The State Objective of Local Control
The principle of local control has been a central point of controversy in
school finance reform due to the polarity of views regarding its role. While
reformers generally point out that deference to local control has the dangerous
potential of veiling state neglect, defenders of local control highlight the need
to create fiscal incentives to spark local school reform. One understandable
concern is that an increased state presence in school financing will create greater
state (and hence less local) regulation of school policies and administration.36
The U.S. Supreme Court articulated such concerns in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez.37 Another worrisome possibility is that support
for public schools will diminish if the direct connection between local wealth
and local schools is severed. In Serrano v. Priest,38 the landmark ruling on
California's school funding system, the California Supreme Court recognized
this distinction between administrative and fiscal control.39 Though acknow-
ledging the importance of both, the court found the first, the state interest in
decentralized administration, unpersuasive as a rationale for the state's reliance
on local property wealth:
[E]ven assuming arguendo that local administrative control may be a
compelling state interest, the present financial system cannot be
considered necessary to further this interest. No matter how the state
decides to finance its system of public education, it can still leave this
decision-making power in the hands of local districts.0
and sometimes impossible today to expand the 'money pie' in the Indiana school corporation's General Fund
over and above the increase provided by the State.").
35. See Anne E. Preston & Casey Ichniowski, A National Perspective on the Nature and Effects of
the Local Property Tax Revolt, 1976-1986, 44 NAT'L TAX J. 123 (1991).
36. For an overview of the administrative aspects of local control, see Charles F. Faber, Is Local Control
of the Schools Still a Viable Option?, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 447 (1991).
37. 411 U.S. 1, 49-51 (1973).
38. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
39. Id. at 1241.
40. Id. at 1260.
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While local administration may be an important objective, there is no reason
to suspect that the decentralization of authority is necessarily untenable under
alternative schemes of school financing.
The state's interest in local fiscal control, however, is more directly
threatened by attacks on the local property tax. The theory behind local fiscal
control is that communities will be most responsive to educational needs if given
the means to express their support of local schools through locally assessed
property taxes. The argument is a forceful one, and at least one author has
suggested that Serrano's mandate to divorce local property wealth from school
spending served to provoke California's limits on property taxation via
Proposition 13.l Although that contention is no doubt disputable, the argument
against pouring all local revenues into a statewide pool carries much intuitive
weight: in the absence of a clear, local connection between burden (taxation)
and benefit (education), continued support for basic school funding rests on a
dubious foundation. Local taxpayers are likely to perceive the social benefit of
funding their own local public schools, but may be more resistant to taxes which
are funneled through the state capital to schools in other corners of the state.
Therefore, the crucial variable in protecting local fiscal control is the local
resident voter's perception as to where her property tax revenues are being spent.
To maintain local fiscal control and to avoid severing the burden-benefit
connection, local control over residential wealth is necessary. This logic,
however, does not require retention of nonresidential property in the local tax
base.42
B. Tax and Spending Uniformity
Just as absolute local control would eliminate the possibility of creating
greater equity in school finance, so too would an insistence on penny-for-penny
spending uniformity botch local control. This buck-per-kid approach would
require massive central involvement in the budgeting process, leaving no room
for local fiscal incentives. Similarly, perfectly equitable tax rates across all
districts would only exacerbate inequities, in addition to silencing the voice of
local communities.
The classic reconciliation of equity and local control concerns is the district
power equalizing approach, which Professors Coons, Clune and Sugarman
outlined in Private Wealth and Public Education!3 Under the district power
41. See WiVrliam A. Fischel, Did Serran6 Cause Proposition 13?, 42 NATL TAX J. 465 (1989). Proposition
13 amended the California constitution to provide for sharp restrictions on the ability of local governments
to generate revenues through property taxes.
42. But see Helen F. Ladd, Local Education Expenditures, Fiscal Capacity, and the Composition of
the Property Tax Base, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 145 (1975) (suggesting resident voters may perceive they bear
part of property tax levied on local firms, either in reduced future tax base due to locational changes sparked
by local tax rates or in higher prices for locally consumed goods).
43. JOHN E. CooNs ET AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970).
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equalizing scheme, each school district would receive the same per pupil amount
for an equal tax effort. The object is to divorce district wealth from expenditure
levels, to ensure that, for example, a 3% rate will generate an equal per pupil
amount regardless of district property wealth. This approach has been criticized
on several grounds. M First, to the extent that assessment is left to local officials,
district power equalizing creates an incentive for districts to assess low and tax
high. Another disadvantage of this approach is that it does not address the issue
of tax uniformity, and the potential benefits to be derived from taxing nonresi-
dential property on a uniform basis throughout the state. Third, the equalizing
technique leaves open the possibility (however unlikely) of localities abandoning
their schools, enunciating as its foremost concern district wealth neutrality to
the potential detriment of adequate per pupil spending. Finally, the district power
equalizing approach is politically vulnerable, because it requires additional state
taxes in order to compensate property-poor districts. In the end, the debate over
the district power equalizing approach may not have revealed solutions, but it
has highlighted the difficulty of addressing multifarious interests from a
theoretical perspective. The STNP proposal faces many of the same criticisms.
The next two sections, therefore, will provide theoretical and empirical analyses
of STNR
III. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE STNP PROPOSAL
Once the definition of local control as control over local residential property
wealth is accepted, retention of nonresidential property in the local tax base is
no longer justified under a local control rationale. The next analytical step is
to appraise the intuition behind the proposal to remove nonresidential property
from local taxation for school funding purposes. In 1971, the Minnesota
legislature enacted into law a statute removing from local tax bases in the
Minneapolis-St. Paul area a portion of the growth in local commercial and
industrial wealth. A theoretical analysis of the STNP approach, therefore, begins
with an examination of the Minnesota law.
A. The Conceptual Framework of Minnesota's Fiscal Disparities Act
The Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities Act45 governs the seven-county
metropolitan area of Minneapolis-St. Paul and provides a mechanism under which
40% of increased revenue resulting from property tax on commercial and
industrial property is pooled and redistributed to communities according to their
44. For general criticism of the district power equalizing approach, see Schoettle, supra note 11; Inman
& Rubinfeld, supra note 12; Zelinsky, supra note 12.
45. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473F.01 (West Supp. 1992).
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population and fiscal capacity. The statute sets forth several purposes, four of
which are relevant to the inquiry of this Note:
(1) To provide a way for local governments to share in the resources
generated by the growth of the area... ; (2) To increase the likelihood
of orderly urban development by reducing the impact of fiscal consider-
ations on the location of business and residential growth and of
highways, transit facilities and airports; (3) To establish incentives for
all parts of the area to work for the growth of the area as a whole;
(4) To provide a way whereby the area's resources can be made
available within and through the existing system of local governments
and local decision making... 46
In upholding the constitutionality of the Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities Act,
the Supreme Court of Minnesota issued dicta4 7 alluding to the connection
between the challenged statute and the then recent Rodriguez decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court. Citing the Court's call for "innovative and new thinking,"
Justice Otis of the Minnesota Supreme Court added that "[t]he fiscal disparities
statute is a bold and imaginative departure from conventional devices for
balancing the benefits and burdens of taxation." 4
Although the STNP approach rests upon many of the same principles as
Minnesota's Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities Act, the two differ in important
respects. Under the Minnesota statute, the pooled portion of commercial-
industrial property tax revenues is derived only from 40% of revenue increments,
or commercial growth. Because the program is focused on growth in the tax
base, it is primarily aimed at managing fiscal competition among the competing
jurisdictions for new investment. Nonetheless, the concept of pooling property
tax revenues derived from nonresidential property and dedicating those resources
to municipalities according to population and fiscal capacity has clear relevance
to the issue of equitable school funding. Underpinning both the Minnesota Act
and STNP is the policy norm that revenues generated from taxing nonresidential
property need not necessarily be distributed according to the situs of such
property. Dispensing with situs permits the state government instead to distribute
these revenues according to need, thereby minimizing fiscal disparities and the
constitutional infirmities associated therewith.
46. Id.
47. Village of Bumsville v. Onischuk, 222 N.W.2d 523, 532 (Minn. 1974), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S.
916 (1975).
48. Id., quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 58 (1973).
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B. Determining an Appropriate Distribution Formula
Under a system allocating the authority to tax nonresidential property to
the state, only residential property taxation remains in the control of the local
jurisdictions.49 There are a variety of ways of taxing nonresidential property on
a statewide basis and allocating the proceeds according to residential taxing
capacity. In her classic study of the proposal to pool and redistribute nonresi-
dential property tax revenues, Professor Helen Ladd uses the following formula:
PUBI--.
A2= WR istaCt
where A2 is the portion of the pooled revenues to be received by the district,
PUB is the number of public school students in the district, WR is the per pupil
residential wealth of the district, and i represents the districts.50 Thus, as Ladd
notes, "the share received by each community varies [1] directly with the number
of students and [2] inversely with the residential wealth per pupil." 51 Under
the Ladd formula, the amount a district will receive from the pooled revenues
depends upon how that district's pupil count and residential wealth factors
compare to the same factors in other districts. This result is due to Ladd's
disregard for one of the primary advantages of the property tax, its budgetary
flexibility. The property tax permits local governments to assess the value of
property, and determine a tax rate which will generate sufficient revenues to
cover local budgetary needs. Ladd moves backward, setting the rate against
nonresidential property first, and distributing the fixed total proceeds according
to her formula. This achieves tax-neutrality with respect to nonresidential
property, which renders a fair simulation, but unnecessarily distorts the
distribution of funds.
49. Many types of property could correspond to either category or constitute entirely separate categories.
See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1987 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, TAXABLE
PROPERTY VALUES ix. [hereinafter CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS]. The Census of Governments breaks down
property according to use into the following categories: nonfarm residential property, acreage (agricultural),
vacant platted lots, commercial and industrial, other, and unallocable. Id. This Note distinguishes only between
residential and nonresidential property. A different legislative scheme could of course provide for more detailed
distinctions.




The problem with the Ladd formula is that it does not provide a good proxy
for need. A mathematical hypothetical puts this problem into better perspective.
Suppose District A has a pupil count of 60,000 and residential wealth of $18,000
per pupil, while District B has a pupil count of 50,000 and residential wealth
of $15,000 per pupil. Under Ladd's formula, the numerator for each district is
3.34, indicating that both districts will receive the same portion of the state's
pooled commercial-industrial property tax revenues. But at a 4% rate against
its $18,000 per pupil residential wealth, District A can generate $720 per pupil,
while District B can generate only $600 per pupil. To arrive at a similar per
pupil level of, for example, $1,000, District A needs $16,800,000 while District
B needs $20,000,000. Ladd's approach confers equal amounts upon districts
of differing needs.
The hypothetical is complicated by consideration of a third district, C, which,
let us suppose, has a pupil count of 8,000 and residential wealth per pupil of
$50,000. Under Ladd's formula, District C by mathematical necessity receives
some portion of the pool. Yet a 4% rate can generate $2,000 per pupil in District
C, a figure hardly illustrative of need for further assistance. The demographic
reasons behind this distortion are hinted at by Professor Zelinsky, who has noted:
[T]he size of a particular community is highly correlated with the
proportion of its residents attending the public schools. Larger cities
tend to have a relatively small proportion of their populations enrolled
in the public education system. In smaller communities, a significantly
larger share of the residents are public school pupils. This finding is
consistent with independent evidence that the households which leave
the central city for the suburbs tend to be families with large numbers
of school age children and that a prime motivation for emigration to
outlying communities is the belief that the suburbs offer a healthier
environment for raising young children. 2
Given these demographic realities, the residential wealth per pupil for large cities
is likely to be high, as compared to the state's other communities. It should come
as no surprise, therefore, that the distribution formula that Professor Ladd
presents adversely impacts urban centers. Under the Ladd formula, every district
receives something, notwithstanding its actual need. And just as some districts
will receive more than they need, other districts will receive less. To arrive at
a distribution formula which is more reflective of each district's actual ability
to generate resources, a specific baseline of need is required. Nonresidential
property tax revenues may then be used to offset those amounts which local
residential property is unable to generate. The result, therefore, is that revenues
generated by nonresidential wealth will be targeted to those communities where
52. Zelinsky, supra note 12, at 183 (citations omitted).
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homeowner wealth is the weakest. This Note employs such a needs-focused
approach.
C. Mechanics of the Proposed Distribution Formula
Rather than focusing on the comparison of districts' pupil-to-wealth ratios,
the STNP proposal establishes a target level of per pupil taxing capacity.
Assuming a hypothetical state's taxable property to consist of 60% residential
property and 40% nonresidential property, the state will assess and tax the 40%
nonresidential property on a statewide basis and distribute the proceeds according
to each district's remaining residential property taxing capacity. If TAV is the
state's total assessed valuation, then under the hypothetical division above, TAV
x 0.60 equals the value of residential property, or RV, and TAV x 0.40 equals
the value of nonresidential property, or NRV. While RV will remain within the
exclusive taxing authority of the localities in which it is located, the state will
use the proceeds derived from the uniform statewide taxation of NRV to ensure
that a given rate T assessed against each district's RV generates a certain
minimum per pupil revenue level, Y. The purpose of the NRV pool, therefore,
will be to equalize the districts' remaining taxing capacity up to the amount Y.
Once T is imposed against the districts' differing values of local residential
property, it will generate varying per pupil amounts from district to district.
These amounts, subtracted from the Y figure, determine the amount per pupil
to be received from the nonresidential pool. Where T can generate substantial
revenues, the district will receive a smaller proportion of the NRV pool. If T
generates very little, the districts will benefit significantly from the NRV pool.
In both cases, local districts will be permitted to tax their residential tax base
beyond T, if a district so chooses, to derive any extra revenues per pupil that
local programs might necessitate.
Concrete figures help to put this hypothetical into perspective. For purposes
of empirical analysis, suppose the state wants to guarantee that for each school
corporation a 2.5% tax rate on its residential property will generate $1135 per
pupil. I choose these figures to ensure that the proposal is tax-neutral with respect
to nonresidential property. Therefore, a rate of 3.03%, equal to the previous
burden on nonresidential property, must be assessed against all nonresidential
property in the state.53 This has the simple effect of ensuring that each school
corporation may derive a total of $1135 per pupil from a 2.5% tax against its
residential property. If 2.5% generates $3000 per pupil, a district will derive
no resources from the pool. If 2.5% generates $1134, a district will receive $1
per pupil.
53. The aggregate tax burden on nonresidential property for the 119 sample school corporations was
3.03%. Several different rate-revenue combinations were simulated to determine which combination would




The overall effect, therefore, is to distribute the resources derived from the
state's nonresidential property wealth to those districts which have low levels
of residential property wealth per pupil. Local control, defined as local resident
voter responsiveness to local educational needs, is preserved. Tax equity is
achieved with respect to nonresidential property, and with respect to residential
property, equal tax effort will generate equal resources, up to the minimum
guaranteed nonresidential pool grant. Those inequities generated from taxing
beyond the trigger rate are left unaddressed in order to preserve some degree
of local fiscal control.
The most crucial aspect of this proposal, however, is that it raises a new
line of normative policy questions. In the past, school finance reformers have
challenged states' reliance on local property wealth disparities as without a
rational basis. In contrast, the formula proposed herein would oblige legislators
to set residential and nonresidential rates in accordance with reasoned policy
considerations. The accidents of property wealth that school corporations now
face would be replaced by equal access to a level of taxing capacity determined
by the state. And to the extent local control is a legitimate state interest, the
figures may be modified to increase the portion of funding not subject to
equalization. The proposal permits legislators to weigh the concerns of equity,
local control and the distribution of the tax burden. At present, districts have
widely varying taxing capacities, local fiscal decisions are governed by levy
limitations, and one's tax burden depends largely upon the degree of wealth
in the community. On an intuitive level, the STNP proposal works to redress
these problems, but an empirical analysis is needed to gauge the proposal's actual
impact.
IV. EMPmICAL ANALYSIS OF THE STNP PROPOSAL
Whether STNP will in fact work to ameliorate fiscal disparities in school
finance is a question that can only be resolved empirically. The analysis provided
below is an effort to approximate STNP's empirical effect on local General Fund
property taxes in a sampling of twenty-eight Indiana counties and the 119 school
corporations within those counties s4 Although the figures used here were
derived from the most recent and detailed sources available, it is important to
recognize that this simulation, like any other, has important statistical
54. The 28 counties are those used by the Census Department in the 1987 Census of Governments in
determining indiana's taxable property values. The survey methodology explains that "[t]he sample was
designed to yield simple unbiased estimates of statewide assessed value aggregates that would be subject
to relative standard errors of no more than 2 percent for most States, and no more than 3 percent for New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont." Ce NsUS OF GOVERNMENTS, supra note 49, at vi. A more detailed
explanation of survey methodology is contained in the introduction to the document at v-xxiv.
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limitations55 which suggest that the true impact of STNP can only be understood
through actual implementation.
A. School Expenditure and Property Value Data Examined
To conduct the simulation, the assessed value, per pupil assessed value,
General Fund tax rate, and per pupil revenue generated by such rate were
compiled for each of the sample school corporations. Using 1986 percentages
to distinguish local property values by use category,56 the total nonresidential
value and the per pupil residential value of each school corporation were derived.
The per pupil residential value of each school corporation was then multiplied
by 2.5% and subtracted from $1135 to derive a per pupil amount to be secured
from the pooled nonresidential property tax revenues. Multiplying this amount
by each school corporation's pupil count gives a total amount to be received
from the pooled revenues.
As noted above, these calculations ensure that the 2.5% tax burden on
residential property (local) and a 3.03% tax burden on nonresidential property
(statewide) will generate for all school corporations a minimum per pupil
property tax revenue of $1135. The simulation assumes that school districts will
work to sustain their current revenue levels, taking advantage of the pooled
resources if eligible.
B. Results of the Simulation
The most significant result of the STNP simulation is that all of the 119
districts' ability to generate revenue would be equalized up to a per pupil revenue
figure of $1135. Because local property wealth disparities are the focus of the
legal objections to current school funding systems, the uniformity and equal
protection claims which litigants continue to raise around the country would
be moot under STNP. This is not to say that the quality of education would be
uniform as a consequence of these changes, but rather that the local wealth
disparities giving rise to constitutional claims are specifically redressed.
Under the combination of figures used for this simulation, nonresidential
property taxpayers in the aggregate should be indifferent to STNP, because the
55. Three primary sources provide the statistics for simulation. Per pupil expenditure and assessment
figures used herein are for the 1990-91 school year and are setforth in THE INDIANA FARM BUREAU, SCHOOL
STATISTICAL REPORT 1991, supra note 22. The percentage breakdown of property values by use category
is set forth in CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, supra note 49. The figures are broken down principally by county
and occasionally by city. An important assumption concerning these breakdowns, however, is that the ratio
of residential to nonresidential property is uniform within any given county. The simulation incorporates
cities' distinct use category percentages where available. Income and poverty status information used herein
is set forth in BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND
HOUSING, SUMMARY SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND HOUSING CHARACrERISTICS: INDIANA (1992) [hereinafter
1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING].
56. CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, supra note 49 at 96-99.
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total burden on nonresidential property is unchanged. Of course, those with prior
rates above 3.03% would benefit from the proposal, while those with rates lower
than 3.03% would lose. School districts, in contrast, will either maintain previous
revenue levels or undergo a per pupil revenue increase up to the $1135 figure.
The residential property taxpayer also either stands to gain or lose, through
higher or lower property tax rates. All of this suggests that this proposal would
face widely varying proponents and opponents. Nonetheless, armed with
constitutional arguments and the alternative prospect of court intervention,
proponents of a system to tax nonresidential property on a uniform statewide
basis could likely garner sufficient political force for implementation.
With respect to the overall impact on General Fund tax rates and per pupil
revenues generated thereby, school corporations fall into one of three categories
as a result of the simulation. Category I school corporations are listed in Table
A.1 of the Appendix and include those whose residential value when taxed at
2.5% generates more than $1135. Because of the high level of residential wealth
in these communities, their schools will not draw from the pool. Nine of the
119 school corporations fall into this category. In effect, these nine school
corporations must increase their tax rates in order to sustain previous revenue
levels because nonresidential property is removed from their taxable property
and nothing is added. All nine Category I school corporations, therefore, will
lose under this proposal.
Category II school corporations are listed in Table A.2 of the Appendix
and include those whose residential value when taxed at 2.5% does not generate
$1135, but whose previous per pupil revenue was less than $1135. It is assumed
for the purposes of the simulation that these corporations will take advantage
of the pool, even though prior local property tax revenues were less than $1135.
Therefore, all of these school corporations will move to a 2.5% General Fund
rate and a $1135 per pupil revenue level. Fifty-nine of the 119 school corpora-
tions fall into this category. To determine whether these fifty-nine gain or lose
under this proposal, the previous per pupil taxable property figures for each of
them were compared with the per pupil taxable property figure equivalent to
the 2.5%, $1135 combination, or $45,400. Four of the fifty-nine school
corporations had per pupil taxable property figures exceeding $45,400 and
therefore will lose under this proposal. The remaining fifty-five, however, benefit
from a more advantageous rate-revenue combination than under the status quo.
Fifty-five of the fifty-nine Category II school corporations, therefore, will gain
under this proposal, while four will lose.
Category III school corporations are listed in Table A.3 of the Appendix
and include those whose residential value at 2.5% does not generate $1135, but
whose per pupil revenue level was greater than $1135. These school corporations
will draw from the pool. However, because the amount received from the pool
is insufficient to match the prior revenue level, it is assumed the school
corporation will further tax its local residential property to reach that prior
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amount. Such school corporations will tax beyond the trigger rate of 2.5%, at
a rate potentially above or below its previous rate. Fifty-one of the 119 school
corporations fall into this category. Of those fifty-one school corporations, fifteen
would be able to sustain their current per pupil expenditure levels at lower tax
rates. The remaining thirty-six must exceed previous rates in order to sustain
their previous per pupil revenue levels. Thirty-six of the Category III school
districts, therefore, will lose under this proposal, while fifteen will gain.
Among Categories I, II and III, therefore, seventy-one school corporations
enhance their fiscal position under STNP and forty-eight lose, assuming a trigger
rate of 2.5% and a baseline property tax revenue figure of $1135. The simulation
assumes that no new revenues are to be derived from taxing nonresidential
property. Under a nonresidential property tax rate of 3.4% rather than 3.03%,
the proposed formula could accommodate a residential trigger rate of 2.5% and
a baseline revenue figure of $1200. Such figures would result in eighty-six school
corporations benefiting from the proposal and thirty-three school corporations
losing. Alternatively, the legislature could choose to reduce the property tax
burden on nonresidential property and offset those reductions with general state
revenues. What becomes clear is that, apart from the specific results of any
particular combination of figures, an important benefit of this proposal is the
array of financing alternatives it produces for state lawmakers. Businesses would
no longer be subject to widely varying tax burdens due to locational decisions,
and school corporations would be less restricted by property wealth factors in
spending decisions. But the overall benefits to the state have never been the
source of the academic dispute regarding statewide taxation of nonresidential
property for public schools. Despite the benefits STNP generates with respect
to equity and efficiency, detractors have held that STNP should be rejected for
its adverse effect on large urban centers. An inquiry as to the specific impact
of this proposal on urban areas, therefore, is the next step.
C. Large Cities: Impact of the STNP Simulation on Indiana's Urban Areas
As noted, the primary academic concern regarding the pooling of nonresi-
dential tax revenues has been the potential for an adverse distributional effect
on urban areas, given their concentration of high levels of commercial and
industrial property and low-income families."7 Therefore, specific results of
the simulation for Indiana's ten largest school corporations are summarized in
Table 1 below:
57. See generally, Ladd, supra note 12.
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TABLE 1. Indiana's Ten Largest School Corporations
School Corporation M.H.I. 58  Current9  Proposed"O
Indianapolis Pub. Sch. $18,019 3.06%, $1292 3.21%, $1292
Fort Wayne Comm. Seh. $26,344 2.62%, $1297 3.07%, $1297
Gary Community Sch. Corp. $19,390 5.97%, $1213 3.21%, $1213
Evansville-Vand. Sch. Corp. $25,798 3.57%, $1658 4.36%, $1658
South Bend Comm. Sch. Corp. $24,131 2.79%, $1245 2.88%, $1245
Vigo County Sch. Corp. $23,505 3.55%, $1011 2.50%, $1135
Hammond City Sch. $26,883 6.21%, $1357 4.34%, $1357
MSD of Wayne Township $27,124 2.56%, $1357 3.20%, $1357
Anderson Comm. Sch. Corp. $23,221 3.11%, $1081 2.50%, $1135
MSD of Perry Township $32,047 2.46%, $1010 2.50%, $1135
The results of the simulation for the state's ten largest school corporations
reveal that half would improve their fiscal positions under this proposal while
half would lose. Of particular concern is the proposal's effect on Indianapolis
Public Schools, the state's largest school district. Nonetheless, three separate
aspects of these results suggest that the impact on school districts in Indiana's
urban areas is generally neutral, and would be unlikely to raise concerns so grave
as to override the greater fiscal equity which STNP generates for the state as
a whole.
First, seven of the ten largest school districts fall into Category HI, which
means that residential wealth was low enough to qualify them for receipt of
pooled resources, but that revenue levels were higher than the $1135 per pupil
amount. The extent to which these school corporations lose under STNP,
therefore, is attributable more to prior revenue levels than to the adverse effect
of the formula on their taxing capacity. This is not to suggest that these school
districts should simply spend less money, but rather that (1) revenue levels
should be financed from increased local residential property tax rates, or (2)
the state should provide greater assistance to accommodate these districts' desired
revenue levels.
Second, to the extent that these districts would be required to raise local
residential property tax rates, the degree of tax increase is slight. Indianapolis
would move from a 3.06% rate to a 3.21% rate, while Fort Wayne would bear
a 3.07% rate, rather than its previous 2.62% rate. These minor increases square
with the intuition that not all large cities have low levels of residential property
58. Median Household Income. 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HousING, supra note 55.
59. 1990-91 General Fund tax rate and revenue level. INDIANA FARM BUREAU, SCHOOL STATISTICAL
REPORT 1991, supra note 22.
60. Under Proposed STNP Approach, General Fund tax rate and revenue level.
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wealth, and that removing nonresidential property from large cities' property
tax bases will not necessarily cripple their fiscal capacity.
Third, STNP would greatly enhance the fiscal capacity of cities such as Gary
and Hammond, where tax rates previously were abnormally high. This is
particularly important for Gary, where the level of household income is low
and the percentage of persons with poverty status is high. The consequence,
therefore, is that where residential property wealth is weakest, the school districts
stand to gain, while areas with high levels of residential property will be required
to depend upon that portion of their tax base more than before. Given the
competing objectives of local control and tax and spending equity, this is
precisely the desired outcome. The current reliance on the situs of nonresidential
property as determinative of taxing authority creates wealth disparities which
raise constitutional difficulties. In contrast, eliminating situs as a source of school
districts' taxing rights gives the state greater flexibility to accommodate
competing constitutional concerns.
D. Transporting STNP to States with Distinct Demographic Characteristics
Although it is clear that different demographic characteristics will alter the
impact of STNP in other states, there are reasons to believe that its benefits are
not limited to states such as Indiana. It is true that where nonresidential property
wealth is heavily concentrated in high poverty areas, application of the proposal
in an unmodified fashion could have an adverse effect on the urban poor. States
such as Illinois or New York, which have large urban centers and distressed
inner city public schools, must be wary of depriving poorer schools of the
nonresidential property tax revenues they currently receive. This admonition,
however, should not diminish the value of STNP even in such large urban center
states.
The object of STNP is to rationalize the distribution of property wealth for
school funding purposes. In response to those who argue that school finance
reform could jeopardize the tax base of America's cities, it should be made clear
that any benefit to urban schools under current property wealth-based systems
is mere happenstance. States can ensure adequate resources for schools with
students of low-income families more explicitly by capturing that greater need
in the pupil count portion of a distribution formula. If, for example, a state
considers each student from a low-income family as 1.5 students, then the flow
of resources into low-income areas would be statutorily ensured. For some states,
such an approach may be politically unrealistic, but its availability should at
least serve to refute those who argue that equalization strategies necessarily result




V. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE STNP PROPOSAL
The STNP approach is not immune from its own potential constitutional
difficulties. Under the uniformity clause of most states' constitutions, a taxing
scheme which subjects residential and nonresidential property within a single
jurisdiction to differing rates might be called into question. In Indiana, this
possibility springs from a 1983 decision of the Hendricks County Circuit Court,
where a statute imposing a tax on interstate motor carriers' indefinite-situs
distributable property was rejected on uniformity and interstate commerce
grounds. 61 The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's interstate
commerce ruling but did not reach the uniformity issue.62 Despite the view
of the lower court, there is ample reason to believe that the current proposal
would withstand a uniformity challenge.
First, the authority of the Indiana General Assembly to classify property
for tax purposes is beyond question. In a 1909 case, the Indiana Supreme Court
validated the legislature's classification authority in the area of real property
taxation in order to serve the dual ends of ensuring a more just valuation of
distinct properties and providing for a more just distribution of property tax
revenues. 63 Second, it is well established under Indiana law that the standard
for determining tax uniformity is that a tax for local purposes must be uniform
throughout the local jurisdiction, while a statewide tax must be uniform
throughout the state.' Under STNP, local residential property taxes would be
directed to local schools (local purpose) and would be the same throughout the
school corporation (local uniformity). Nonresidential property taxes would be
employed to ameliorate fiscal disparities throughout the state (state purpose)
and the rate against such property would be the same throughout the state
(statewide uniformity).
Third, the general reluctance of courts to intrude upon legislative authority,
particularly when the object of new legislation is to remedy constitutionally
suspect policies, would weigh against a challenge to STNP. More specifically,
because a primary object of STNP is to provide for greater tax uniformity, it
is unlikely that the court would return the state to a less uniform system of
taxation in the name of a formalistic view of tax uniformity. Ironically, the very
case providing the constitutional basis for the current system would likewise
work to sustain STNP. Rather than mandating specific funding policies, the
Robinson court established a firm and lasting groundwork for legislative
discretion in the area of school finance.65 In addition, in considering any
61. Private Truck Council of America, Inc. v. Huie, No. CV 882-361 (Hendricks Cir. Ct., Ind. Apr.
20, 1983), aff'd, Huie v. Private Truck Council of America, Inc., 466 N.E.2d 435 (Ind. 1984).
62. Huie v. Private Truck Council of America, Inc., 466 N.E.2d 435 (Ind. 1984).
63. Clark v. Vandalia R.R., 86 N.E. 851 (Ind. 1909).
64. Board of Comm'rs v. State ex rel. Shields, 58 N.E. 1037 (Ind. 1900).
65. Robinson v. Schenck, 1 N.E. 698 (ind. 1885). See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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challenge to STNP, the Indiana courts would benefit from the wisdom of the
Minnesota Supreme Court, which upheld the Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities
Act against a uniformity challenge.66
Finally, if the STNP approach failed to survive a constitutional challenge,
an alternative means of accomplishing the identical policy ends exists. A state
could simply demand that its school districts transfer the revenues generated
from a given portion of nonresidential property taxes to the state government.
The state government could then distribute those resources to school districts
according to the formula detailed above. Although such an approach would lack
the interdistrict taxpayer uniformity benefits of STNP, it could accomplish the
same district equalization objectives. This alternative approach again illustrates
that a uniformity challenge to STNP would likely hinge on formalistic reasoning.
The STNP proposal is designed to accommodate the requirements of the
education clause and the tax uniformity clause simultaneously, rather than
focusing on one to the exclusion of the other.
VI. COLLATERAL POLICY ISSUES
In addition to providing both greater spending and tax uniformity and local
fiscal control, the STNP proposal implicates a variety of collateral policy issues
which are worthy of general note here.
A. Distribution of State Aid Not Derived from Property Taxes
In addition to the equalization formula suggested above, fiscal equity would
be further promoted by distributing nonproperty tax state resources according
to other differences in districts' fiscal capacity. One proposal is that greater
resources be distributed to large cities because of the burden on these munici-
palities of other noneducational expenses. This phenomenon has been termed
"municipal overburden," and has figured prominently in both academic literature
and litigation regarding school finance reform.67 Another possibility is to
disburse state aid in a manner sensitive to local cost differentials.6" Such a
proposal would help to eliminate fiscal disparities, allocating greater funds to
districts with higher local costs.
66. Village of Burnsville v. Onischuk, 222 N.W.2d 523 (Minn. 1974), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 916
(1975).
67. For a treatment of the economics behind the concept of municipal overburden, see Harvey E. Brazer
& Therese A. McCarty, Municipal Overburden: A Fact in School Finance Litigation?, 18 J.L. & EDUC.
547 (1989).
68. See Katharine L. Bradbury et al., State Aid to Offset Fiscal Disparities Across Communities, 37
NAT'L TAX J. 151 (1984) (presenting method of measuring cost differences across communities to assist
in ameliorating fiscal disparities).
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B. Tax Abatements and Deterioration of the Commercial-Industrial Tax Base
Statutes authorizing localities to grant businesses property tax abatements
as a means of attracting investment would necessarily be affected by STNP.
69
Although removing school property tax abatements from communities' economic
development arsenals might hinder their efforts to attract new business, it is
unlikely that cities and towns would be significantly impacted. In addition to
the abatement of general revenue property taxes, local communities would still
have alternative means of attracting commercial investment to the area. A central
policy norm underlying STNP is that schools are simply too important to be
subtracted from the tax benefit generated by local commercial development. 0
In addition, like the Minnesota Fiscal Disparities Act, the STNP approach seeks
to deter an ill-advised fiscal competition among local communities for limited
business investment, at the expense of public schools.
STNP would also insulate schools from deterioration of the local commer-
cial-industrial tax base. By providing for state control of property taxes against
businesses, any revenue losses incurred from interdistrict or interstate locational
changes would be borne by schools throughout the entire state. Likewise, new
investment anywhere in the state would benefit all schools throughout the state.
At present, commercial and industrial locational decisions benefit or harm
particular schools disproportionately because of the reliance on situs as giving
rise to districts' authority to impose property taxes. This proposal would
eliminate that concern and establish incentives for communities to work for the
benefit of the entire state.
C. State Expertise and Assessment Valuation Standards
STNP would provide the Indiana legislature the opportunity to modernize
the present property tax system with respect to assessment valuation standards.
In Indiana today, the standards by which property is valued are determined by
the State Board of Tax Commissioners, in contrast to the fair market value
standard generally used in most states.71 There are three generally accepted
methods for valuing business property: the market approach,72 the income
approach, 73 and the cost approach. 74 Adoption of a market approach or some
69. IND. CODE § 6-1.1-12.1 (1992) provides for tax abatements in economic revitalization areas, which
include areas unable to support normal economic development
70. See William Cells 3d, Schools Lose Money in Business Tax Breaks, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1991,
at AI, B9.
71. See Stroble & D'Avis, supra note 17.
72. The market approach to property valuation generally involves the use of actual or comparative sales
prices as a benchmark in determining the value of a parcel.
13. The income approach is generally considered to be an effective means of assessing the value of
commercial property. It involves the capitalization of future cash flows to determine present value.
74. The cost approach to property valuation uses an estimate of the replacement cost of property to
determine a parcel's value.
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combination of the three accepted valuation standards would ensure greater
assessment uniformity and promote the just valuation of commercial property.
Furthermore, assessment reform would work to foreclose potential constitutional
challenges to the current system. Although these goals could be accomplished
through local assessors and without the implementation of STNP, assessment
reform might be facilitated if coupled with a policy to assess and tax nonresi-
dential property on a statewide basis.
VII. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Note has been to examine the proposal to tax non-
residential property on a statewide basis and to distribute those resources to
school districts according to their residential property taxing capacity. Under
the system by which almost all states currently finance public education, school
districts applying equal tax effort against local property will generate disparate
spending levels, due to their varying levels of property wealth. Likewise,
equitable spending levels require the imposition of inequitable tax rates. The
STNP approach would make the money-raising game fairer by advancing the
tax revenues generated by nonresidential property to those districts where
homeowner wealth is the weakest.
I have presented the STNP proposal first by demonstrating that a school
finance system that relies on property taxes must seek to balance the concerns
of tax and spending equity with the state interest in local control. I then focused
on the fiscal incentives at the core of local control and suggested that local
control may be defined as control over local residential property taxation. Using
this definition, I argued that removing nonresidential property from local tax
bases does not undermine local control. To retain local control under a system
which provides for greater fiscal equity, I suggested that nonresidential property
tax resources be pooled and redistributed to school districts in inverse relation
to their residential taxing capacities. The results of an empirical simulation
suggested that such a system could provide for greater tax and spending equity,
without structural biases against those communities most in need of assistance.
I attempted to defeat some potential constitutional objections to STNP and
suggested arguments in its favor.
It should be clearly understood that the STNP approach I have proposed
here is aimed at redressing the fiscal disparities that currently exist among school
corporations, and not as a means of creating equal educational opportunity for
all schoolchildren. To mistake fiscal equity for equal educational opportunity
ignores the far greater complexities associated with providing children from
diverse backgrounds the equal opportunity to benefit from the public school
system. The object of this Note has been to offer a structure of taxation grounded




TABLE A.1. Category I School Corporations
Current Proposed
School Corporation Rate & Revenue Rate & Revenue
Carmel-Clay Sch. 2.89%, $1807 3.90%, $1807
Whiting City Sch. 3.32%, $4561 5.79%, $4561
Prairie Twp. Sch. 0.67%, $ 648 1.03%, $ 648
MSD of Pike Twp. 2.15%, $3124 3.60%, $3124
MSD of Washington Twp. 2.04%, $1765 3.42%, $1765
Speedway City Sch. 2.37%, $2696 3.97%, $2696
Duneland Sch. Corp. 2.69%, $2174 3.80%, $2174
Washington Twp. Sch. 2.72%, $1933 3.84%, $1933
South Spencer Co. Sch. Corp. 1.86%, $2281 4.99%, $2281
TABLE A.2. Category II School Corporations
Current Proposed
School Corporation Rate & Revenue Rate & Revenue
NW Allen County Sch.
Flat Rock-Hawcreek Sch. Corp.
Lebanon Comm. Sch. Corp.
Western Boone Co. Sch.
Brown County Sch. Corp.
Carroll Cons. Sch. Corp.
Delphi Comm. Sch. Corp.
Delaware Comm. Sch. Corp.
Harrison-Wash. Sch. Corp.




New Albany-Floyd Sch. Corp.
Hamilton Heights Sch. Corp.
Marion-Adams Sch.
Westfield-Wash. Comm. Sch.
North Harrison Sch. Corp.
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TABLE A.2. Category II School Corporations (continued)
Current Proposed
School Corporation Rate & Revenue Rate & Revenue
Prairie Heights Sch. Corp.
Crown Point Comm. Sch. Corp.
Griffith Public Sch.
Hanover Comm. Sch. Corp.
Highland Town Sch.
Sch. Corp. of Hobart
Hobart Twp. Comm. Sch. Corp.
Lake Ridge Sch.
Lake Station Comm. Sch.
Tri-Creek Sch. Corp.
LaPorte Comm. Sch. District
New Praire Utd. Sch. Corp.
Alexandria Comm. Sch. Corp.
Anderson Comm. Sch. Corp.
Elwood Comm. Sch. Corp.
South Madison Sch. Corp.
West Central Comm. Sch. Corp.
Franklin Twp. Sch. Corp.
MSD of Decatur Twp.
MSD of Perry Twp.








Union-North Utd. Sch. Corp.
Scott Co. Sch. District #1
Scott Co. Sch. District #2
North Spencer Co. Sch. Corp.
Switzerland Co. Sch. Corp.
Vigo County Sch. Corp.
Centerville-Abington Sch.

















































































TABLE A.3. Category III School Corporations
Current Proposed
School Corporation Rate & Revenue Rate & Revenue
East Allen County Sch.
Fort Wayne Community Sch.
MSD of SW Allen County
Bartholomew Cons. Sch. Corp.
Eagle Union Comm. Sch. Corp.
Monroe Comm. Sch. Corp.









Kankakee Valley Sch. Corp.
Rensselaer Central Sch. Corp.
Westview Sch. Corp.
East Chicago City Sch. Corp.
Gary Community Sch. Corp.
Hammond City Sch.
Lake Central Sch. Corp.
Merrillville Comm. Sch. Corp.
Munster Comm. Sch.
South Central Sch. Corp.
Michigan City Area Sch.
Cass Twp. Sch.
Dewey Twp. Sch.
New Durham Twp. Sch.
Beech Grove City Sch.
Indianapolis Public Sch.
MSD of Lawrence Twp.
MSD of Warren Twp.
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TABLE A.3. Category III School Corporations (continued)
Current Proposed
School Corporation Rate & Revenue Rate & Revenue
N. Montgomery Sch. Corp.




John Glenn Sch. Corp.
South Bend Comm. Sch. Corp.
LaFayette Sch. Corp.
Tippecanoe Sch. Corp.
West Lafayette Sch. Corp.
Evansville-Vand. Sch. Corp.
Richmond Comm. Sch. Corp.
Frontier Sch. Corp.
North White Sch. Corp.
Tri-County Sch. Corp.
Twin Lakes Sch. Corp.
2.94%, $1583
2.68%, $1141
3.04%, $1188
3.26%, $1272
2.97%, $1289
3.40%, $1224
2.79%, $1245
3.36%, $1853
2.34%, $1278
2.72%, $2017
3.57%, $1658
3.25%, $1290
3.28%, $1486
3.35%, $1773
2.61%, $2072
2.51%, $1193
4.39%, $1583
2.53%. $1141
2.69%, $1188
3.00%, $1272
3.00%, $1289
2.85%, $1224
2.88%, $1245
4.78%, $1853
2.96%, $1278
4.58%, $2017
4.37%, $1658
3.14%, $1290
4.54%, $1486
5.68%, $1773
5.61%, $2072
2.82%, $1193
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